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Abstract [169 words] 
 
In a recent contribution (2017) Professor Gordon takes a very critical stance on our earlier article titled 
“Decades not lost, but won” (Blind and Lottanti von Mandach 2015), which he sees as ‘revisionist’ and as 
applying ‘too low a standard’. Professor Gordon provides a selection of granular data that might be 
understood as refuting two of our earlier findings, and attempts replication of the analysis underlying our 
third finding, but finds diverging evidence. While his labelling of our research is unpleasant, the implicit and 
explicit questioning of our results is troubling.  
This reply demonstrates that the evidence in Professor Gordon’s article does not challenge our 
earlier findings on aggregate developments during the ‘lost decades’ and provides explanation for the 
diverging results in Professor Gordon’s replication effort. We argue that the results of his replication only 
apply to the fraction of non-regular employees working full time, while ours applies to the large majority of 
part-time employees.  
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In a reappraisal of long-term labour market developments in Japan, we have provided 
evidence on three central questions. First, desire not need was the major cause of the rise in 
non-regular employment. Second, regular employment has not been replaced by non-
regular employment in aggregate perspective. And third, wage gaps between men and 
women, as well as between regular non-regular employees have narrowed significantly 
between 1988 and 2010. In his recent article “New and Enduring Dual Structures of 
Employment in Japan: The Rise of Non-Regular Labor, 1980s–2010s” (2017) Professor 
Gordon variously offers a strongly critical view on our work. Namely, ‘revisionist’ and 
‘applying too low a standard’ are labels unpleasant to receive on one’s research, 
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particularly so when they come from a historian and highly-ranked academic. The 
revisionist label is inappropriate inasmuch as our article does not attempt to revise, but to 
broaden what we consider a calamitously narrow account of the Japanese labour market in 
recent social science and public discourse.  
For a start, let us explain why we see the current representation of Japanese labour market 
as calamitously negative. Such negative portrayal may become part of a vicious circle and 
effectively worsen the prospects for positive change as it contributes to shaping public 
perception. As recently shown in a study on the determinants of anxiety in Japanese 
individuals aged 25 to 34 (Hommerich 2016), perceptions of the gap society are a signi-
ficant influencing factor, even considerably more important than their personal experience. 
As we firmly believe that science has a responsibility to inform public perception in the 
least interpretative way possible, the following sections review Professor Gordon’s 
objections relative to the three central questions initially raised.  
2. Need versus desire to work in non-regular employment 
Understanding of a higher share of non-regular employment as an absolute indicator of 
undesired labour market outcome is in itself a normative interpretation (compare the 
likening of contemporary labour market structure to the 1920s in Gordon 2017:18). If, 
however, the recent surge in non-regular employment in Japan reflects a desire rather than 
a need, such indicator would not be appropriate. As suggests our earlier analysis (2015:76-
79) as well as survey data (MHLW 2015) most of the increase in regular employment has 
originated from a desire, and not from a need to do so (which arguably represented the 
major motivation in the 1920s).  
In our article we chose an aggregate perspective for two reasons. First, we wanted 
to provide a ‘big picture’ perspective. Second, we wanted to mitigate the risk of missing 
out on relevant context when selecting examples. In contrast, Professor Gordon has chosen 
to provide more detail. For instance, citing a 2010 MHLW report he notes that 38-55% of 
non-regular men of prime working age would prefer to work as regular employees. For 
assessing the relevance of this number, we expand the 3.6% share of these individuals in 
total employment (calculated from MHLW 2015a) by the average 46.5% (simple mean of 
38 and 55%) desiring regular employment. Doing so, we find that this particular piece of 
evidence pertains to a mere 1.69% of employed individuals. While it is deplorable that 
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these 1.69% of employed individuals in 2010 could not enjoy their preferred working 
conditions, we argue that non-regular employment is still far better than being unemployed 
(which is a much likely alternative in a more rigidly regulated labour market). In any case, 
we see this example as detrimental to developing an understanding of the ‘big picture’. 
In another instance, Professor Gordon cites a 2012 Sômushô report that finds 
considerable shares of new entrants to the labour market (29% of men and 49% of women) 
who took non-regular employment for their first post-graduation job between 2007 and 
2012. Common sense arguably suggests that a vast majority of young individuals prefers 
regular employment. However, as data from the Labour Force Survey reveals, less than 
half of non-regular employees aged 25-34 in 2015 were non-regular out of need, i.e., 
through a perceived absence of regular alternatives (MHLW 2015:1). Expanding the 
figures cited by Professor Gordon with the respective ratios of involuntary non-regular 
employment (40.0% for men, 19.4% for women), one understands that about 11.6% of 
young men and 9.5% of young women are possibly working in non-regular employment 
due to the perceived absence of a regular alternative.  
‘Perceived’ is an important limitation to the validity of this survey-based data. This 
is because the job-to-applicant ratio for regular employment of new entrants has been 
above 1 since 2014 and currently figures at a historically high 1.34 (MHLW 2017). 
Essentially, this means that regular employment would literally be available for all recent 
new graduates. It would imply, however, compromise in terms of preferred location, 
industry, and and effort in terms of own skill level. Findings of a narrowing wage gap 
between urban and rural areas (Abe and Tamada 2008) indicate that the geographic 
dimension might actually be critical in bringing about this mismatch. 
3. The rise of non-regular employment: Worsening conditions or employment growth 
It further seems to us that the relative share of non-regular employment as a normative 
measure of labour market outcomes may have guided Professor Gordon’s understanding of 
the rise of non-regular employment as a ‘turn’ or ‘shift’ rather than an ‘expansion’. 
Admittedly, he acquiesces the aggregate expansion of employment beyond the 1988 labour 
market structure as documented in our 2015 article, but disqualifies as ‘too low a standard’ 
our criterion of non-regular employment being normatively superior to no employment 
being created (2017: 15). In our view, if a status change from non-working to working as 
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non-regular employee originates from a corresponding desire (as evidenced in the previous 
section), our choice of criterion seems fairly adequate. 
In contrast, it seems to us that Professor Gordon’s own standard may not be entirely 
appropriate for judging such development. This becomes obvious from the said expansion 
of employment by 6.9 million more women (and 3.0 million men) in non-regular 
employment than was to be expected based on the 1988 labour market structure. Professor 
Gordon qualifies this development as a ‘loss’ (p. 26). From our perspective, however, this 
could only qualify as loss, if these women had formerly been working as regular 
employees. But, importantly, they have not been working at all. Taking this line of thought 
one step further, one understands that the share of regular employment cannot adequately 
serve as measure of labour market outcomes: If women working part-time representing a 
loss relative to not working at all, this would imply that they had been better off not 
working at all.  
The normative label of ‘loss’ is present in another instance where Professor Gordon 
remarks that women in manufacturing industries have “lost far more jobs” than men (p.19). 
As above, such label would need to rely on evidence that women had preferred to keep 
these jobs. But without further evidence, the opposite is equally possible: Women may just 
have been more successfully adapting to structural change than men. Against that 
background it seems to us that Professor Gordon’s conclusion of women in manufacturing 
as constituting “a disposable buffer of ‘non-regular regular’ employees” is not warranted. 
4. Persistent or closing gaps? 
Drawing “on the same Basic Survey” (p. 29) as in our 2015 article, Professor Gordon finds 
that the gap between regular and non-regular wages has been narrowing only for “women 
in small firms of a limited age range”. Accordingly, he finds “a persistent and large wage 
gap” (p.30).  
As we infer from his Graphs 18 and 19 (p.31), his analysis is based on wage data 
for fulltime non-regular employees. This category, however, corresponds to an average of 
18.7% of all non-regular employees in the 1988-2010 period analysed in our article 
(calculated from MHLW 2015a). In contrast, in our analysis we have chosen to use data 
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for hourly wages (p. 79)1 as these reflect the development as faced by the 81.3% majority 
of individuals in non-regular employment. As Professor Gordon finds no major widening 
of pay gaps in fulltime non-regular employment, we can correspondingly amend our earlier 
finding: The wage gap between regular and non-regular fulltime employees has narrowed 
substantially2, overwhelmingly driven by increases in hourly wages of part time employees. 
Against this background we believe that the attribute ‘persistent’ is not appropriate. 
Whether the gap has to be considered ‘large’ is a matter of perspective. Professor 
Gordon refers to a JIL report to point out that the fraction of 57% of wages earned by non-
regular employees relative to regular employees was lower than for “major European 
countries” (ibid:31). Drawing on the same source (JIL 2015:177), one may want to add that 
this corresponds to almost double (!) the ratio of the US (30.5%). If one further corrects the 
Japanese data for unpaid overtime of regular employees estimated at 30 hours per month 
(Ogura and Sakaguchi 2004:26), the adjusted ratio for Japan would figure at about 68%, 
which is roughly in line with Italy and the United Kingdom (JIL 2015:177). It seems, to us, 
therefore, that the wage gap is neither persistent, nor exceptionally large.  
Our earlier analysis of wage gaps has further documented a substantial narrowing 
of the gender wage gap both in regular, and in non-regular employment (2015:section 4). 
This coincides with OECD statistics, which document that Japan has experienced one of 
the largest reductions in gender pay gap of all OECD countries (OECD 2017) in the course 
of the ‘lost decades’. In light of these findings Professor Gordon’s statement of gender as a 
“more prominent source of division than before” (p. 30) is difficult to apprehend. 
 
The analysis of wage gaps is not only insightful in its own right, but is also 
meaningful for understanding aggregate supply and demand movements in the labour 
market. If demand for non-regular labour increases, wage hikes relative to regular 
employment (as documented by the narrowing gap; this section) are necessary to create the 
supply needed to satisfy demand, i.e., to convince more individuals to join the workforce 
                                                
1  Professor Gordon’s footnote 13 (2017:29) reads: “It is not clear whether Blind and Mandach (2015) 
include bonuses in their calculations.” Eventually, our calculations do include bonuses, which we have 
explicitly mentioned  (ibid:79). 
2  As our analysis spans some 20 years, we generally share Lise, Sudo et al.'s 2014 assessment that the 
"overall trends are not sensitive" to the 2006 change in definitions (590). Eventually, our 2015 data on 
regular workers includes less than 7% full-time non-regular workers (number of contract workers relative 
to total number of regular employees including executives by the post 2005 definition). Yet, as Professor 
Gordon's 2017 analysis implies wages of full-time non-regular employees have seen an almost perfect 
correlation with that of regular employees. Thus, our 2015 analysis is not affected at all from the 
inclusion of contract workers for the post 2005 period, and negligibly only for the pre 2005 period. 
 6 
(as seen from general employment growth; section 3). In turn, convincing individuals to 
join the work force means to instil a corresponding desire to earn a wage (section 2).  
5. Conclusion 
As variously acknowledged in our earlier contribution, quite some issues remain to be 
solved or improved in the Japanese labour market such as further efforts in bringing down 
the still substantial gender wage gap (Kato, Kawaguchi, and Owan 2013; Chiang and 
Ohtake 2014), increasing female participation in regular employment beyond birthgiving 
(Cooke 2010; Abe 2011; Macnaughtan 2015)3, or alleviating gender differences in career 
tracks (Nemoto 2013; Chiang and Ohtake 2014).  
However, assessing our findings (2015) in the light of Professor Gordon’s recent 
article, we conclude that the lost decades have seen at least three positive developments. 
(1) The rise of non-regular employment was mainly driven by desire, not need. (2) In 
aggregate perspective, the rise of non-regular employment originates from an expansion of 
employment, not a replacement of regular by non-regular jobs. (3) Wage gaps between 
regular and non-regular employment have significantly narrowed, mainly driven by 
strongly increasing wages in part-time employment.  To this adds further evidence on a 
strongly narrowing gender wage gap (OECD 2017), and an alleviation of the urban-rural 
divide in wages (Abe and Tamada 2008).  
Obtaining more detail is instrumental for developing a better understanding of these 
issues. Against that background, the rich data provided in Professor Gordon’s article such 
as on the composition of the aggregate expansion of non-regular work as resulting from 
increases and decreases in particular industries (2017:18-22) is very insightful. However, 
where detail feeds general conclusion with relevant context being omitted (as discussed in 
sections 2 and 4), we see methodological risk as materialising.   
If such conclusions live on in the academic sphere, they may turn into what has 
come to be known as ‘stylised facts’. These, for their part, may become further 
disseminated even without giving reference (e.g., as “increasingly polarized regular-non-
regular gap in wages” in North 2017:8). While such development may be deplorable in 
                                                
3 Important cues about this issue may be drawn from Abe (2013a) who finds significant regional variation 
in female regular employment rates. Findings from regions with high participation may indicate measures 
for improvement in other regions. 
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science, it may detrimental if it impacts on public perception via mechanisms such as a 
reduced propensity to consume, etc.  
In closing, we would like to suggest a conjectural explanation for social movements 
as having ‘unfortunately’ remained ‘quiet’ (p. 35) around the issue of non-regular 
employment In the days of “Contests for the Workplace” (Gordon 1993), a large majority 
of workers took their jobs for necessity (not desire). In contrast, this only holds for a 
minority of non-regular employees in present day Japan. However, a negatively affected 
majority may be decisive in reaching the critical mass required to spark social movement 
as can be seen from the regional examples of pacifist and anti-nuclear protest. 
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